

Algumas consequências políticas da desigualdade económica.

Pedro Magalhães (ICS-ULisboa)

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Dois grandes tipos de consequências políticas:

1. *Estabilidade* da democracia.

- Estabilidade democrática é afectada por desigualdade?
- Consequências para apoio popular à democracia.

2. *Qualidade* da democracia. Efeitos na:

- Participação eleitoral.
- Polarização ideológica.
- Captura económica das políticas públicas.

1. Estabilidade democrática: ideias contraditórias.

- Democracia gera pressões para redistribuição; para as elites dominantes, desigualdade aumenta custos de redistribuição em relação aos custos da repressão (Boix 2003; Acemoglu & Robinson 2005).
- Democracia protege contratos e direitos de propriedade; para as elites dominantes, desigualdade aumenta este valor da democracia (Ansell & Samuels 2010 e 2015).
- Democracia redistribui, mas protegendo interesses de classe média instruída; e desigualdade não é incompatível com esses interesses (Iverson & Soskice 2019).

1. Estabilidade democrática: resultados.

TABLE 1
EMPIRICAL STUDIES ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
INEQUALITY AND DEMOCRACY

<i>Studies</i>	<i>Inequality Data</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Effect of Inequality</i>	<i>Limitations</i>
Bollen and Jackman (1985)	income quintiles (World Bank, N≤60)	weighted 2SLS	none	data quality and quantity no distinction democratization/ consolidation no nonlinear test cross-sectional
Muller (1988)	income Gini income quintiles (World Bank, N≤33)	bivariate reg.	none (dem.) negative (cons.)	data quality and quantity one control (econ. dev.) no nonlinear test cross-sectional
Midlarsky (1992)	land Gini (N≤72) agric. density (N≤97) income quintiles (World Bank, N≤55)	OLS	positive (land) none (income)	data quality and quantity no distinction democratization/ consolidation no nonlinear test potential reverse causation cross-sectional
Muller (1995)	income Gini income quintiles (World Bank, N≤64)	OLS	negative	data quality and quantity no distinction democratization/ consolidation no nonlinear test cross-sectional
Burkhart (1997)	income quintiles (World Bank, N≤224)	2SLS	inverted U	data quality and quantity no distinction democratization/ consolidation
Barro (1999)	income Gini income quintiles (D&S, N≤303)	seemingly unrelated reg. (SUR)	negative (weak)	data quality and quantity no distinction democratization/ consolidation no nonlinear test
Boix (2003) and Boix and Stokes (2003)	income Gini ^b (D&S, N≤1042) % family farms	dynamic probit	negative	data quality and quantity no nonlinear test
Epstein et al. (2004) ^a	infant mortality	Markov transition Tobit	negative (Markov) inverted U (tobit)	data quality

TABLE 1, *cont.*

<i>Studies</i>	<i>Inequality Data</i>	<i>Method</i>	<i>Effect of Inequality</i>	<i>Limitations</i>
Papaioannou and Siourounis (2005) ^a	income Gini (World Bank, N≤1570) ^c	probit	none	data quality and quantity
Ansell and Samuels (2008) ^a	income Gini (B&M, N≤4728) ^c % family farms	dynamic probit	positive (income) negative (land)	data quality

^a Unpublished. Two of these papers have been published (Epstein et al. 2006; Papaioannou and Siourounis 2008), but the published versions do not include the analysis on inequality.

^b N inflated by taking five-year averages.

^c N inflated through linear interpolation. D&S denotes Deininger and Squire 1996. B&M denotes Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002.

1. Estabilidade democrática: resultados.

All over the place.

- Efeitos nulos, positivos e negativos.
- Problemas:
 - Maus/poucos dados históricos sobre desigualdade.
 - Que desigualdade? Entre lares/indivíduos; pobreza/privação absoluta; distribuição funcional de rendimentos; riqueza vs. rendimento.
 - A variável dependente: resultados mudam de acordo com indicadores/definições de democracia (Ludders e Lust 2018).

1. Apoio popular à democracia.

- Muitos estudos mostram uma correlação negativa entre desigualdade e atitudes pró-democráticas (Krieckhaus et al. 2014).
- Meu estudo com Besir Ceka: desigualdade aumenta gap entre ricos e pobres no apoio à democracia liberal (Ceka & Magalhães 2020).




Figure 4. Commitment to liberal democracy (three-way interaction): Marginal effects of a moving from low to high income deciles in autocracies and liberal democracies (min. and max. of V-Dem) over various values of Gini.

1. Em democracias, relação entre rendimento e apoio à democracia é **positiva**.
2. Em autocracias, relação entre rendimento e apoio à democracia é **negativa**.
3. Magnitude do efeito rendimento em ambas as direcções aumenta com desigualdade.

2. Qualidade da democracia: Participação.

- Pobres votam menos que ricos.
- Desigualdade económica amplifica este *gap*.

Does Economic Inequality Depress Electoral Participation? Testing the Schattschneider Hypothesis

Frederick Solt

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


Fig. 1 Predicted probability of voting by level of income inequality. *Dashed lines* represent the bounds of the 95% confidence interval. All other variables held constant at median values. *Source:* Model 1, Table 1





Fig. 2 Estimated income bias by level of income inequality. *Dashed lines* represent the bounds of the 95% confidence interval. All other variables held constant at median values. *Source:* Model 1, Table 1

2. Qualidade da democracia: Polarização.

- Quanto mais estratificado o rendimento, mais divergentes os interesses das bases partidárias dos partidos.
- Partidos reflectem esse divergência afastando-se ideologicamente.



Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal

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


Figure 2.8: *Polarization and Income Inequality*. The y-axis show the difference in median positions for the two parties and the Gini coefficient in the United States. The Gini coefficient is a measure of income inequality that ranges between 0 (perfect income equality) and 1 (one person controls 100% of the nation's income).


Working Paper

Inequality, macroeconomic performance and political polarization: A panel analysis of 20 advanced democracies


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(a) GiniMarket vs GiniNet




(b) Extreme left- and -right vs middle vote share


Figure 1: Income inequality measures and parliamentary vote shares (cross-country averages). Sources: [Döring and Manow \(2015\)](#) and [Solt \(2016\)](#).




2. Qualidade da democracia: Captura.

- Desigualdade aumenta interesse em/capacidade de mais ricos capturarem o processo político
- Difícil de medir e avaliar. Mas...



Senators Responsiveness to Income Groups





Affluence and congruence: unequal representation around the world*

Noam Lupu[†] and Zach Warner[‡]

June 27, 2019




Figure 1: Affluence bias around the world. Values represent the relationship between affluence and absolute left-right distance to legislators, with the richest quintile as the baseline. Dots indicate point estimates with lines for 95% confidence intervals. For each quintile, dots on the left are from the dyadic model without random effects, estimated using IWLS, dots in the middle are mean estimates from 250 bootstrap replicates from the dyadic data, and dots on the right are from models using the EMD. See Table A1 in the online appendix for complete regression results.

Affluence and congruence: unequal representation around the world^{*}

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



Figure 4: Affluence bias by issue-area in Sweden. Dots represent estimates of the relationship between mass occupation and congruence on privatization, the size of the public sector, inequality, NATO, refugees, and banning pornography. The baseline is white-collar professionals. Lines indicate 95% confidence intervals. See Table A4 of the online appendix for complete regression results.

Why Hasn't Democracy Slowed Rising Inequality?

Adam Bonica, Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal

Figure 5

Concentration of Income and Campaign Contributions in the Top 0.01 Percent of Households and Voting Age Population



Source: For income data, Piketty and Saez (2013).

Notes: The dark line tracks the share of campaign contributions in all federal elections donated by the top 0.01 percent of the voting age population. The number of donors included in the 0.01 percent share of voting age population grew from 16,444 in 1980 to 24,092 in 2012. During the same period, the minimum amount given to be included in the top 0.01 percent grew in real terms from \$5,616 to \$25,000 (in 2012 dollars). The shaded line tracks the share of total income (including capital gains) received by the top 0.01 percent of households. The figure includes individual contributions to Super PACs and 527 organizations but excludes contributions to nondisclosing 501c(4) organizations, which are recorded to have spent approximately \$143 million in 2010 and \$318 million in 2012, much of which was raised from wealthy individuals. Were it possible to include contributions to nondisclosing 501c(4)'s, the trend line would likely be 1–2 percentage points higher in 2010 and 2012.

Ideias principais

1. Não sabemos se, como e que tipo de desigualdade afecta capacidade de sobrevivência de regimes democráticos.
2. Possível que relação relevante seja entre desigualdade *horizontal* (Stewart 2001) e estabilidade de regimes (sobreposição entre desigualdade económica e grupos sociais relevantes — étnicos, religiosos, por exemplo).

Ideias principais

3. Indicações de que desigualdade afecta certas qualidades da democracia:

3.1 Aumento da polarização ideológica.

3.2 Diminuição da participação eleitoral entre os mais pobres.

3.3 Aumento da capacidade de influência dos mais ricos nas políticas públicas.

Obrigado.