

BOB HALL'S DISCUSSION OF "USE IT OR LOSE IT: EFFICIENCY GAINS FROM WEALTH TAXATION" BY GUVENEN, KAMBOUROV, KURUSCU, OCAMPO, AND CHEN

Which tax base is better?

$$\pi(a, z) + ra$$

or

$$\pi(a, z) + (1 + r)a$$

.

THE PAPER...

compares a tax on what it calls capital income to a tax on wealth arising from that income

THE PAPER...

compares a tax on what it calls capital income to a tax on wealth arising from that income

The dynamic environment resembles modern economies with extreme dispersion in wealth

THE PAPER...

compares a tax on what it calls capital income to a tax on wealth arising from that income

The dynamic environment resembles modern economies with extreme dispersion in wealth

Most of the wealth is generated within a lifetime; inherited wealth is not so important

THE PAPER...

compares a tax on what it calls capital income to a tax on wealth arising from that income

The dynamic environment resembles modern economies with extreme dispersion in wealth

Most of the wealth is generated within a lifetime; inherited wealth is not so important

A wealth tax wins because its improvement in efficiency outweighs its tendency to increase the dispersion of wealth

.

THE BASIC SETUP

People have three roles in the economy—workers, wealth managers, and consumers

THE BASIC SETUP

People have three roles in the economy—workers, wealth managers, and consumers

The modeling of workers and consumers is conventional

THE BASIC SETUP

People have three roles in the economy—workers, wealth managers, and consumers

The modeling of workers and consumers is conventional

The modeling of wealth managers is novel and exciting—they acquire physical capital and make highly specialized intermediate products that are enormously profitable; some managers are much better at doing this than others.

.

WEALTH MANAGERS EARN GIGANTIC PROFITS

The parameter μ , is the reciprocal of the residual elasticity of demand for a wealth manager's product

WEALTH MANAGERS EARN GIGANTIC PROFITS

The parameter μ , is the reciprocal of the residual elasticity of demand for a wealth manager's product

Its value is 0.9 (Table II)

WEALTH MANAGERS EARN GIGANTIC PROFITS

The parameter μ , is the reciprocal of the residual elasticity of demand for a wealth manager's product

Its value is 0.9 (Table II)

Profit per unit of marginal cost is $\mu/(1 - \mu) = 9!$

WEALTH MANAGERS EARN GIGANTIC PROFITS

The parameter μ , is the reciprocal of the residual elasticity of demand for a wealth manager's product

Its value is 0.9 (Table II)

Profit per unit of marginal cost is $\mu/(1 - \mu) = 9!$

That's realistic for high-tech, but not for the economy as a whole

.

WEALTH MANAGERS POTENTIATE PHYSICAL CAPITAL

They operate an Ak technology and some have really high values of A , called $z_{i,h}$ in the paper

WEALTH MANAGERS POTENTIATE PHYSICAL CAPITAL

They operate an Ak technology and some have really high values of A , called $z_{i,h}$ in the paper

Some start in the fast-lane H state, where their productivities are their birth levels raised to the power 5

WEALTH MANAGERS POTENTIATE PHYSICAL CAPITAL

They operate an Ak technology and some have really high values of A , called $z_{i,h}$ in the paper

Some start in the fast-lane H state, where their productivities are their birth levels raised to the power 5

Each year, they face a hazard of 5 percent of dropping to their birth productivities

WEALTH MANAGERS POTENTIATE PHYSICAL CAPITAL

They operate an Ak technology and some have really high values of A , called $z_{i,h}$ in the paper

Some start in the fast-lane H state, where their productivities are their birth levels raised to the power 5

Each year, they face a hazard of 5 percent of dropping to their birth productivities

After that, they face a hazard of 3 percent of losing all of their productivity for the rest of their lives

.

MORE ON PRODUCTIVITY

Parameters of the process chosen to match the fraction of the most wealthy entrepreneurs who started from scratch, which is one half

MORE ON PRODUCTIVITY

Parameters of the process chosen to match the fraction of the most wealthy entrepreneurs who started from scratch, which is one half

The resulting distribution of wealth has a Pareto tail, but is somewhat less unequal than in US data

.

RELATION TO THE LITERATURE ON CAPITAL TAXATION

Most of the literature considers an economy with a clean separation between labor and capital income, as in a standard competitive RBC model

RELATION TO THE LITERATURE ON CAPITAL TAXATION

Most of the literature considers an economy with a clean separation between labor and capital income, as in a standard competitive RBC model

Here, most of the income arises from extreme market power

RELATION TO THE LITERATURE ON CAPITAL TAXATION

Most of the literature considers an economy with a clean separation between labor and capital income, as in a standard competitive RBC model

Here, most of the income arises from extreme market power

And, the Ak technology does not have a clean separation between labor and capital

.

DIAMOND-MIRRLEES, *AER* (1971A)

In an Arrow-Debreu setting, capital is an intermediate product—period- t output is an input in period- $t + \tau$ production

DIAMOND-MIRRLEES, *AER* (1971A)

In an Arrow-Debreu setting, capital is an intermediate product—period- t output is an input in period- $t + \tau$ production

Unless a tax on an intermediate product leaves the economy on its production frontier, the tax is undesirable in the sense that a tax system that does not tax intermediate goods is dominant

.

DIAMOND AND SAEZ, *JEP*, FOOTNOTE 14

The aggregate efficiency theorem in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) is sometimes cited as support for not taxing capital income. Taxes on transactions between households and firms (that do not vary with the particular firm) do not interfere with production efficiency. While taxing all capital income of households will generally change the level of savings, and so investment, it does not move the economy inside the production possibility frontier. Thus, the aggregate efficiency theorem, that the optimum is on the production frontier, has no direct implications relative to taxing the capital income of households.

DIAMOND AND SAEZ'S CASE FOR TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME

1. It's hard in practice to separate labor earnings, which plainly should be taxed under any view, from capital income

DIAMOND AND SAEZ'S CASE FOR TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME

1. It's hard in practice to separate labor earnings, which plainly should be taxed under any view, from capital income
2. Households face borrowing constraints; the constrained households hold no capital; there is sorting of a low-consumption group, so capital taxation permits lower taxes on their earnings

DIAMOND AND SAEZ'S CASE FOR TAXATION OF CAPITAL INCOME

1. It's hard in practice to separate labor earnings, which plainly should be taxed under any view, from capital income
2. Households face borrowing constraints; the constrained households hold no capital; there is sorting of a low-consumption group, so capital taxation permits lower taxes on their earnings
3. The literature on the inverse Euler equation recommends rising consumption taxes in later years of the life cycle, which is accomplished by positive taxes on capital income

THE INCOME CONFUSION PROBLEM

The Survey of Consumer Finances reports households' valuations of their nonfinancial business equity


THE INCOME CONFUSION PROBLEM

The Survey of Consumer Finances reports households' valuations of their nonfinancial business equity

The businesses are owner-managed, so this is an indication of a source of income that is predominantly return to the owners' efforts

.

THE UNEXPECTED IMPORTANCE OF ENTITIES WITH LARGE COMPONENTS OF LABOR INCOME, SCF, 2013



THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CAPITAL INCOME TAX AND A WEALTH TAX

After-tax return with capital income tax at rate τ_k :

$$r_k = (1 - \tau_k)(MPK - \delta)$$

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CAPITAL INCOME TAX AND A WEALTH TAX

After-tax return with capital income tax at rate τ_k :

$$r_k = (1 - \tau_k)(MPK - \delta)$$

After-tax return with wealth tax at rate τ_a :

$$r_a = MPK - \delta - \tau_a$$

THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN A CAPITAL INCOME TAX AND A WEALTH TAX

After-tax return with capital income tax at rate τ_k :

$$r_k = (1 - \tau_k)(MPK - \delta)$$

After-tax return with wealth tax at rate τ_a :

$$r_a = MPK - \delta - \tau_a$$

To equalize after-tax returns at the level r ,

$$\tau_a = \frac{\tau_k}{1 - \tau_k} r$$

.

NORMAL THINKING

has been that capital income taxes and wealth taxes are essentially equivalent

NORMAL THINKING

has been that capital income taxes and wealth taxes are essentially equivalent

This paper has enough new features to make a wealth tax far superior

.

TERMINOLOGY

The paper talks about taxation of capital income and wealth,
but it is really about two kinds of taxes on wealth managers

TERMINOLOGY

The paper talks about taxation of capital income and wealth, but it is really about two kinds of taxes on wealth managers

The “capital tax” in 4(a) bears on the flow of profit $\pi(a, z)$ and on wealth, ra ; the first term is very different from any normal concept of capital income

TERMINOLOGY

The paper talks about taxation of capital income and wealth, but it is really about two kinds of taxes on wealth managers

The “capital tax” in 4(a) bears on the flow of profit $\pi(a, z)$ and on wealth, ra ; the first term is very different from any normal concept of capital income

The “wealth tax” in 4(b) bears on the same measures, but puts much higher weight $1 + ra$ on wealth, so it is more like a capital income tax

.

REALLOCATION AND EQUITY

Much of the discussion in the paper considers the differences in allocations induced by the differences in the two tax regimes

REALLOCATION AND EQUITY

Much of the discussion in the paper considers the differences in allocations induced by the differences in the two tax regimes

There are important differences in allocational efficiency and in equity, measured as the dispersion in consumption

REALLOCATION AND EQUITY

Much of the discussion in the paper considers the differences in allocations induced by the differences in the two tax regimes

There are important differences in allocational efficiency and in equity, measured as the dispersion in consumption

The “wealth tax” is superior at putting the capital in the hands of the more capable managers, but results in more dispersion in wealth

REALLOCATION AND EQUITY

Much of the discussion in the paper considers the differences in allocations induced by the differences in the two tax regimes

There are important differences in allocational efficiency and in equity, measured as the dispersion in consumption

The “wealth tax” is superior at putting the capital in the hands of the more capable managers, but results in more dispersion in wealth

APPRAISAL

The model is closely in touch with the realities of modern entrepreneurship, where a small number of clever people make infinitely large fortunes within their lifetimes (superstars)

APPRAISAL

The model is closely in touch with the realities of modern entrepreneurship, where a small number of clever people make infinitely large fortunes within their lifetimes (superstars)

Much to be preferred to Piketty's line of thought emphasizing inherited wealth with dynastic accretion

APPRAISAL

The model is closely in touch with the realities of modern entrepreneurship, where a small number of clever people make infinitely large fortunes within their lifetimes (superstars)

Much to be preferred to Piketty's line of thought emphasizing inherited wealth with dynastic accretion

Not clear that the Ak setup is descriptive; it invites the confusion about capital taxation

APPRAISAL

The model is closely in touch with the realities of modern entrepreneurship, where a small number of clever people make infinitely large fortunes within their lifetimes (superstars)

Much to be preferred to Piketty's line of thought emphasizing inherited wealth with dynastic accretion

Not clear that the Ak setup is descriptive; it invites the confusion about capital taxation

Thinking about this paper has shifted me toward the view that treating all business income as labor income may not be such a bad idea, but I don't see any role for wealth taxation