

9.^a Conferência do Banco de Portugal

Desenvolvimento económico português no espaço europeu



The Effects of the Increase in Parental Leave Benefits on Wages

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9ª Conferência do Banco de Portugal Desenvolvimento Económico Português no Espaço Europeu







(1) About this dissertation

- 1. The increase of benefits for a group of workers may have a negative effect on the target, through the increase of the relative costs ("mandated benefits");
- The introduction of parental leave benefits in 2009 ("quasi-experiment") is the setting to estimate the answer of the labor market.





(2) The setting

- The changes studied were introduced by Decree-Law 91/2009 having had its start in May 2009, namely:
 - The new 'sharing bonus', increasing the length of parental leave when the leave is shared between both parents (condition: each parent has to take 30 days to qualify);
 - Increase of the mandatory initial leave exclusive for the father;
 - Increase of the extended parental leave, paid at 25%.





A methodology of difference-in-differences in used, following:

 $\log(W_{it}) = \alpha + \beta_1 treat_i + \beta_2 after_t + \beta_3 after_t \times treat_i + W_{it}\gamma + \varepsilon_{it}$

for individual *i* in year *t*. Y_{it} is our variable of interest – the real hourly wage and W_{it} is the set of observable characteristics for both the employee and the firm. $after_t$ is a dummy set to one for the period covered by the legislation and zero for the period before, 2007 and 2008. $treat_i$ is a dummy variable that equals 1 for treatment group. $after_t \times treat_i$ is the interaction term of interest.





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Treatment group – employees targeted by the legislation, that is, those that may have children and use the benefits. **Control group** – employees that are not targeted by the legislation.





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Three Period specifications

- 1. B: [2007, 2008] A: [2009, 2012]
- 2. B: [2007, 2009] A: [2010, 2012]
- 3. B: [2007, 2008] A: [2010, 2012]





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 $\hat{\beta}_3$, the coefficient, will measure the effects of the legislation change on the treated group.

• $\hat{\beta}_3 < 0 \rightarrow$ mechanism of shifting of the costs to lower wages has happened

If there is no adjustment of wages, some of these may have happened:

Barriers to adjustment;

•The worker does not value the increase in parental leave benefits.





(4) Data

- Used *Quadros de Pessoal,* a data set collected every year in October by the Ministry of Labor, Solidarity, and Social Security
- Compulsory participation for all the firms within the Portuguese private sector
- The information is provided for the employer-employee pairs age, wage, gender, education, qualification, type of employment contract, district, economic sector,...
- Dependent variable is the real hourly wage (in natural logarithm) generated from the existing variables.





(5) Identification Strategy

The use of the *DiD* methodology assumes that:

- The treatment and control groups are following a common trend prior to the new legislation, suggesting that:
- The paths of the outcomes for both groups would not have been different in the absence of the new legislation.




Figure I – Parallel trend





(5) Identification Strategy

- Objective: identify the target group and a control to assess the impact of DL 91/2009
- A reasonable help: looking at the statistics on

•Live births by age group of females and males;

•The use of leave benefits by age group of females and males in 2009 (below)




Figure II – Use of leave benefits by age group





(5) Identification Strategy

- It is then possible to point to a set of possible treatmentcontrol pairs, to use in the experiment, which are submitted to the parallel trend test.
- Following the results, a main pair is chosen:
 - Treatment group: individuals aged [25-40];
 - ➤Control group: individuals aged [55-60]
- Alternative pairs that agree to the parallel trend requisite are also selected as for robustness purposes later on.

Pairs	S	Treatment	Control	(1) No Covariates	(2) With covariates
1		[25-40]	[55-60]	0.026	0.0003
				(0.000)	(0.000)
2		[20-40]	[55-65]	0.022	-0.0009
				(0.000)	(0.000)
3		[25-40]	[50-55]	0.020	0.0004
				(0.000)	(0.000)
4		[20-40]	[50-60]	0.016	0.0004
				(0.000)	(0.004)
5		[20-40]	[50-65]	0.018	-0.0006
				(0.000)	(0.000)



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Table I – Parallel trend test



(6) Findings

Results show that:

- $\hat{\beta}_3 < 0$, meaning the workers are bearing (part of the) costs of the legislation change, through lower wages.
- Negative impact of the legislation of -3.6% for the relative wages of treated individuals considering the
 - full sample, that is statistically significant.
- The impact is more expressive for the male group.

	Per	riod specificatio	on
	[1]	[2]	[3]
A. Full Sample			
After	0.101	0.023	0.108
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Treat	-0.389	0.126	-0.331
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
After X Treat	-0.037	-0.050	-0.061
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	7 729 036	7 729 036	6 263 298
B. Female			
After	0.103	0.023	0.107
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Treat	-0.316	0.208	-0.266
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
After X Treat	-0.035	-0.047	-0.055
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	3 578 637	3 578 637	2 901 667
C. Male			
After	0.102	0.026	0.112
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Treat	-0.410	0.108	-0.347
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)
After X Treat	-0.040	-0.055	-0.070
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes
No. of observations	4 150 399	4 150 399	3 361 631



Table II – Estimates for the main pair



(6)	Robustness
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The four alternative pairs that **survived the parallel trend** are used.

Same pattern can be seen here:

- 1. Estimated negative impact of the policy;
- 2. More expressive results for the male group.

A **falsification exercise** is also conducted using placebo-treated groups and control pairs. Results display less expressive coefficients than the ones found in the experiment.

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_	Full	Female	Male	
A. Pair 2 - T: [20-40], C:		Feiliale	Male	
After	0.102	0.103	0.102	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Treat	-0.427	-0.344	-0.464	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
After X Treat	-0.038	-0.036	-0.042	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	
No. of observations	9 142 553	4 215 985	4 926 568	
B. Pair 3 - T: [25-40], C:	[50-55]			
After	0.090	0.091	0.090	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Treat	-0.262	-0.232	-0.260	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
After X Treat	-0.026	-0.024	-0.028	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	
No. of observations	8 269 016	3 830 436	4 438 580	
C. Pair 4 - T: [20-40], C:	[50-60]			
After	0.089	0.090	0.089	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Treat	-0.282	-0.244	-0.282	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
After X Treat	-0.026	-0.023	-0.029	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	
No. of observations	10 078 433	4 619 041	5 459 392	
D. Pair 5 - T: [20-40], C:	[50-65]			
After	0.087	0.089	0.086	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Treat	-0.301	-0.252	-0.309	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
After X Treat	-0.023	-0.022	-0.026	
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	
Covariates	Yes	Yes	Yes	
No. of observations	10 359 329	4 727 923	5 631 406	19 de novembro 2018

Table III – Estimates for alternative pairs



(7) Conclusion

- There appears to be a negative impact of the increase in parental leave benefits on the relative wages of the individuals more likely to use the benefit.
- ✓ Findings are consisted with the theory of mandated benefits, as there is a shift to wages following an increase in the cost for the employer.





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