

# On the stability of money demand


Robert E. Lucas, Jr. and Juan Pablo Nicolini

discussion by Francesco Lippi (EIEF)

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Lisbon , June 2015

Fact: the relation between  $M1/GDP$  and  $r$  changes after the 80s  
breakdown mostly due to deposit (not currency)




reserves and M1 central to policy yet absent in standard macro models

# Money: difficult to analyze both in theory and in data

- ▶ what assets serve as money in practice?  
regulation and technical change matter
- ▶ in particular: NOW and MMDA (interest paying deposits) in early 1980s
  - MMDA allowed for limited checking but no limits on ATM withdrawals
  - MMDA close substitute to deposit but included in M2 (not in M1)
- ▶ relevance: e.g.  $M, P, Y, r$  relationship (and welfare)

# Empirical contribution: new measure of M1




Essentially  $M1_{new} = M1 + MMDA$

# Related empirical analysis in Teles and Zhou (2005)

**FIGURE 2**

Actual and estimated real balances M1/P, 1900–2003  
(interest elasticity of 0.5)




Notes: Restricting the interest elasticity to be .5, the estimated real balances

$$\text{are } \left(\frac{M_1}{P}\right)_t = 0.05 Y_t^{0.5}.$$

Source: Authors' calculations and Lucas (2000).

**FIGURE 8**

Actual and estimated real balances, M1/P (1900–79)  
and MZM/P (1980–2003)  
(common interest elasticity of 0.24)



Notes: Estimated 1900–79:  $\left(\frac{M_1}{P}\right)_t = 0.13 Y_t^{0.24}.$

Estimated 1980–2003:  $\left(\frac{MZM}{PY}\right)_t = 0.17 Y_t (i_t - i^e)^{-0.24}.$

$$MZM = M1 + MMMF + MMDA$$

# Model competing means of payments / deposits

$$\max_{n, \gamma, \delta, x, c, d, a} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t U(x_t) \quad \text{subject to} \quad m \geq c\theta^c + d\theta^d + a\theta^a \quad (3)$$

$$nc \geq px\Omega(\gamma), \quad (4)$$

$$nd \geq px [\Omega(\delta) - \Omega(\gamma)], \quad (5)$$

$$na \geq px [1 - \Omega(\delta)]. \quad (6)$$

The law of motion for money balances is

$$m' = \frac{m + T + py(1 - \phi n) - px (k^d (F(\delta) - F(\gamma)) + k^a (1 - F(\delta)) + 1) - (\theta^c - 1)c}{1 + \pi}$$

– Key choices:  $0 < \gamma < \delta$ , and # transactions  $n$  ( $m$  unit elasticity w.r.t.  $y$ )

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– Costs:  $\phi n$ , Fixed cost:  $k^d < k^a$ , “reserve requirements”  $\theta^c, \theta^d, \theta^a$

– “Opportunity cost” of  $m = c + d + a$  is  $\lambda_m = V'(m) \frac{r}{1+r}$  with  $\lambda'_m(r) > 0$

## Tradeoffs

A unit of consumption  $x$  made of purchases of different size  $z$ :

$$1 = \int_0^{\infty} f(z) \frac{z}{\nu} dz$$

- checks have fixed cost per-purchase  $\rightarrow$  convenient for large purchase
- pin down  $\gamma$  (cash-good threshold),  $n$  # transactions

$$\gamma \frac{1}{\nu} \frac{[(\theta^c - 1) + r(\theta^c - \theta^d)]}{n} = k^d \quad (11)$$

$$\frac{n^2 \phi}{(1 - \phi n)} = \frac{r\theta^a + [(\theta^c - 1) + r(\theta^c - \theta^d)] \Omega(\gamma) + r(\theta^d - \theta^a) \Omega(h(r)\gamma)}{[1 + k^d (F(h(r)\gamma) - F(\gamma)) + k^a (1 - F(h(r)\gamma))]} \quad (12)$$

resources spent on “trips” to the bank:  $\phi n$



resources spent on banking services  $k^d(F(\delta) - F(\gamma))$ ,  $k^d(1 - F(\delta))$



# Novelty is the multiplicity of bank liabilities

cash  $c/(c + d + a) = \Omega(\gamma)$

deposits  $d/(d + a)$



- ▶ both cash and deposits are used even at  $r = 0$  if  $\theta^c > 1$
- ▶ No demand for MMDA at  $r = 0$

# Main results from calibration (match 1984 values)

$$c/(c + d + a)$$

$$d/(d + a)$$

Figure 5b: Currency / Demand Deposits - trend component , 1984 - 2012





Figure 5d: Demand Deposits / (Demand Deposits+MMDAs) - trend component, 1984 - 2012



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


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



Figure 6: M1/GDP vs. Interest Rate (3-Month T-Bill), 1915 - 1935 & 1983 - 2012



$$\frac{M}{GDP} = A \frac{1 + (\theta^c - 1)\Omega(\gamma)}{n(r)} \approx \frac{A}{n(r)}$$

# Comments

1. some details (on interest elasticity, multipliers & transaction-costs specification)
2. on modeling M1: beyond households?
3. what did we learn?

# Non-monotone $M(r)$ when both $\gamma$ and $n$ endogenous

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
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
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$\theta_c = 1.01$




$\theta_c = 1.005$




# Interest elasticity of M1 at low interest $r < 0.01$

## Satiation of money balances



## Interest elasticity is small





# M1 and Multipliers

Let  $M = a + b + c$  and remember  $m = c(r, \dots)\theta^c + d(r, \dots)\theta^d + a(r, \dots)\theta^a$

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$$\frac{M}{p y (1 - \phi n)} = \underbrace{\frac{M}{p x}}_{eq. 13} \frac{x}{p y (1 - \phi n)} = \frac{M}{p x} (1 - \text{transaction service})$$

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
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In data (Italy, 2002) transaction frequency varies across assets:

	mean	median
# currency transactions (from $d$ to $c$ )	22 (60 w. ATM)	12 (48 w. ATM)
# deposits transactions (from <i>Wealth</i> to $d$ )	14 (+12 Auto)	2 (+12 Auto)

Source Italian households survey data (Bank of Italy)

# Sectoral breakdown of *M1*: HH and (non-fin) Firms



Notes: M1 is from the Federal Reserve Board of Governors Release H.6 at the end of the period. Firm cash+checking is from the Flow of Funds L.102(A): Nonfinancial business; checkable deposits and currency; asset. Household cash+checking is from the Flow of Funds L.101(A): Households and nonprofit organizations; checkable deposits and currency; asset. All data is not seasonally adjusted and deflated using CPI (CPIAUCNS) from the BLS.

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- ▶ fine tuning control of reserves,  $M, P, y, r$ ?
  - Great motivation but not fully developed

# Conclusions

Very useful measurement

Simple clean theoretical model to think through data

Several implications can be expanded and refined . . . . I look forward to it!