

Discussion of “Involuntary Unemployment and the Business Cycle” by Christiano, Trabandt and Walentin

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
CTW's Selling Points

- Variable labor force  $\Delta u_t \neq -\Delta n_t$
- Positive comovement between employment and the labor force (*US data: 0.67*)
- Employment more variable than labor force (due to procyclical search effort) (*US data: factor of 3*)
- No apparent difficulties matching estimated impulse responses, including LM variables.
- Unemployment includes “active searchers” only
- Employed happier than unemployed


Key Ingredients

1. Imperfect consumption risk sharing: $c_t^w > c_t^{nw}$
 - individuals better off if they find a job
2. Heterogeneity in work disutility
 - some stay out of the labor force
3. Probability of getting a job increases with search effort
 - unemployed do “active search”

A CTW Family



The CTW Labor Market



Some Quibbles

- Probability of finding a job, given effort

$$p(e_t) = \eta + ae_t$$

- Function $p(\cdot)$ independent of labor market conditions. Does this make sense?
 - Non-participants defined by zero effort, but still $p > 0$! Better: $p(0) = 0$
- No history dependence on employment
 - Do we really need i.i.d. work disutility?

More Quibbles

- Unemployment even under perfect information and perfect competition → “frictional”

$$h_t = \int_0^{m_t} p(e_{l,t}) dl \leq m_t$$

- Implications for search effort

$$u_t = 1 - (h_t / m_t) = 1 - (1 / m_t) \int_0^{m_t} p(e_{l,t}) dl = 1 - \overline{p_t}$$


→ $e_{l,t}$ must be procyclical

→ Evidence? Shimer (2004): NO

Comparison to Alternative Models

- Employed better off than unemployed ex-post (vs. models with “full risk sharing”)
 - unfair: individuals care for welfare of the family in those models (otherwise labor force = 0)
- Only “active searchers” counted as unemployed (vs. classical unemployment)
 - irrelevant in practice: U-3 vs. U-4
- Procyclical labor force (vs. classical)
 - no problem if more realistic wealth effects (GSW)


Alternative measures of labor underutilization, U-1 to U-6, 1994-2009



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Dynamic Responses to Three Demand Shocks in the Estimated GSW Model



Source: Galí-Smets-Wouters 2010

Phillips Curves, NAIRU, etc.

- Shall we be surprised?

- Calvo price-setting: $\pi_t = \beta E_t \{\pi_{t+1}\} - \lambda \hat{\mu}_t$
- Perfect competition in LM + other auxiliary

assumptions:

$$\hat{\mu}_t = -\delta(y_t - y_t^*)$$

$$= -\delta(n_t - n_t^*)$$

$$= \delta(u_t - u_t^*)$$

$$\Rightarrow \pi_t = \beta E_t \{\pi_{t+1}\} - \lambda \delta(u_t - u_t^*)$$

- Holds only in the “toy model”
- It’s not a NAIRU...

Leftovers

- Labor market variables used in the estimation of CTW model but not for the “standard model”: unfair!
- Steady state wage markup: 1.01
→ implausible high labor demand elasticity !!

(to Larry: remember Greenland?)