First Conference on Financial Stability



Pedro Duarte Neves • Banco de Portugal Vice-Governor Madrid, 24-25 May 2017

Thursday, 25 May 2017

Panel Chair: Javier Suárez (CEMFI)

12:00-13:15 The countercyclical provisions of the Banco de España,

Jesús Saurina and Carlos Trucharte (Banco de España)

Discussants: Richard Herring (The Wharton School)

Pedro Duarte Neves (Banco de Portugal)





1. Background: a timeline of events

2. Some thoughts on countercyclical provisions, countercyclical capital buffers and IFRS 9

3. Countercyclical provisions: an assessment



1. A timeline of events

1992-1993 • Spanish banking crisis • Introduction of countercyclical provisions in 2000 Spain 2005 Countercyclical provisions adapted to IAS • Lower limit was removed to enable release of 2008 provisions • End of countercyclical provisions 2016 • Phase-in of countercyclical capital buffers 2018 • IFRS 9



2. Some thoughts on countercyclical provisions, CCB and IFRS 9

	Spanish countercyclical provisions	Countercyclical capital buffer	IFRS 9
Type of tool	Provisioning (direct impact on P&L)	Capital buffer	Provisioning (direct impact on P&L)
Responsibility	Prudential authority	(Macro)prudential authority	Accountants/ auditors
Calibration	Fixed formula (bank level)	Time-varying (country level)	Time-varying (exposure level)
Rules versus discretion	Rules based	Guided judgment	Substantial discretion (own models)



2. Some thoughts on countercyclical provisions, CCB and IFRS 9

	Spanish countercyclical provisions	Countercyclical capital buffer	IFRS 9
Expected loss/forward looking approach	✓	X	√
Avoid "too- little-too-late"	✓	√	✓
Anchored on the aggregate evolution of credit (macro perspective)	✓	✓	X
Anchored on idiosyncratic risk	X	X	✓



2. Some thoughts on countercyclical provisions, CCB and IFRS 9

	Spanish countercyclical provisions	Countercyclical capital buffer	IFRS 9
Cyclicality:			
i) Expected behavior in booms	1	1	5
ii) Expected behavior in busts	1	1	1
Overall effect	countercyclical	countercyclical	5



3. Countercyclical provisions: an assessment

On countercyclical provisions (what could not have been achieved...):

- Could we have expected countercyclical provisions to be a key element in limiting credit growth?
- Could we have expected countercyclical provisions to be a key element in affecting lending policies or credit standards?
- Could we have expected that countercyclical provisions would have worked alone without the use of other macroprudential measures (LTV, LTI, DSTI, for instance)?



BANCO DE PORTUGAL 3. Countercyclical provisions: an assessment

On countercyclical provisions (what has been achieved...):

- Were countercyclical provisions designed in the best possible way (calibration and definition of risk categories)? (ex-post assessment)
- Did countercyclical provisions contribute to build a sizeable buffer in the Spanish banking sector?
- Were countercyclical provisions an innovative and relevant contribution to the international regulatory and supervisory community?

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