THE MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF LEGISLATED TAX CHANGES IN PORTUGAL

ABSTRACT

This paper develops a new measure of quarterly discretionary tax shocks for Portugal that covers the period from 1996 to 2012 and was based on the so-called narrative approach. The main distinctive feature of this approach is that tax shocks are dated and quantified on the basis of a comprehensive analysis of tax policy measures, and not by econometric estimations. The findings point to strongly negative and persistent effects of legislated tax increases on GDP and private consumption, in line with narrative studies for other countries that yielded comparatively high tax multipliers.

1. Introduction

The interaction between fiscal policy and economic activity is a recurrent topic of economic research. In a period when large fiscal policy shifts have been enacted both in Europe and in the US, in the aftermath of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, this topic remains fully relevant. This is particularly so for Portugal, as the country is facing a significant fiscal tightening under the Economic and Financial Assistance Programme while, at the same time, a consensus has been reached that economic growth is of paramount importance in facing the fiscal sustainability challenges ahead.

There is an open discussion about the size of tax multipliers, i.e. the impact on economic activity of each euro of shift in taxes. The difficulties in measuring these multiplier effects stem firstly from the two-folded character of the relationship between taxes and GDP, as not only changes in taxes have an impact on economic activity, but also GDP swings affect tax revenues. In addition, the two variables may be simultaneously influenced by many factors that when omitted cause biased estimations of the impacts of taxation. Another problem relates to the uncertainty about the time of reaction to fiscal measures and time horizons considered by economic agents.

There are mainly two empirical approaches to estimate the impact of fiscal shocks on output, the Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) and the narrative. The SVAR approach, followed for example in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), uses fiscal (normally national accounts) data and relies on assumptions regarding their automatic contemporaneous reaction to movements in economic activity, in order to isolate the non-systematic component of fiscal policy. An application of this methodology for Portugal can be found in

* See Pereira and Wemans (2013b) for full details on the methodology used in this article and additional results. This article benefited from an exchange of views about the characteristics and quantification of some of the tax measures in the sample with Ana Filipa Correia, Vanda Cunha, José Pereira and Hélder Reis and from information of this kind already available at Banco de Portugal. Furthermore, the authors are grateful for the comments and suggestions made by Nuno Alves, João Amador, Mário Centeno, Jorge Correia da Cunha and Maximiano Pinheiro. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of Banco de Portugal or the Eurosystem. Any errors and omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.

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Pereira and Wemans (2013a). By contrast, the derivation of shocks in the narrative approach, followed in this paper and envisaged in Romer and Romer (2010), is more direct and intuitive, as tax policy shocks are dated and quantified according to legislation and contemporary budgetary analyses. In fact, this approach relies on a very comprehensive study of the most important tax changes that occurred in a given country, including the examination of implementation details and expected revenue effects, in order to construct the series of shocks. Although time-consuming, this approach has the advantage of not depending on assumptions regarding the automatic response of fiscal variables to GDP.

The narrative approach also looks into the motivation behind tax policy actions. The aim of this analysis is to isolate and exclude from the shock measure the actions that result from the willingness of government to influence economic activity and that could bias the estimates. As discussed in the paper, measures of this kind are anyway rather infrequent in Portugal during the period considered.

Another challenge when measuring the impact of fiscal policy is posed by the fiscal data available. The narrative approach has the advantage of being independent of accounting rules (and their widely known limitations), while having the disadvantage of depending on information that partly emanates from the political process and is subject to noise. Gathering comprehensive and consistent narrative information about tax changes is very demanding and this has limited the number of studies in this vein. In fact, there are still few works in the wake of Romer and Romer, Cloyne (2010) for the UK being one of the exceptions. Other papers such as Devries et al. (2011) take a related approach that considers annual data and major fiscal policy shocks only, while covering a wide range of countries. There is an older strand of narrative studies started by Ramey and Shapiro (1998) that look into the effect on economic activity of military spending shocks. Note that this method is hard to extend to other types of expenditure shocks that are more difficult to track and quantify (see European Commission 2013, Part III, for a discussion of this issue).

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sources, and presents a list of measures implemented in Portugal between 1996 and 2012 and the type of information gathered about them. The motivation behind these actions as a potential source of endogeneity is analysed in section 3.

Section 4 explains the implementation details in converting the tax measures into a quarterly series of tax shocks. This procedure is not straightforward and depends, for example, on assumptions regarding economic agents’ response to anticipated changes in income. An alternative series of shocks is derived on the basis of different underlying assumptions. This section ends with an analysis of the series of tax shocks.

Section 5 uses the constructed series of shocks to measure the effects of discretionary tax policy on output. The benchmark response of GDP to a positive tax shock is strongly negative with a multiplier that reaches -1.3 one year out. This response is statistically significant, but surrounded by sizeable uncertainty. As extensions to the main findings, this section assesses in particular the robustness of the results to the exclusion of particularly large measures from the sample and controlling for public expenditure. The end of section 5 compares these multipliers with the findings in Pereira and Wemans (2013a).

Section 6 discusses evidence from considering alternative assumptions in the derivation of the shocks, while section 7 focuses on the response of some output components to changes in taxation. Finally, section 8 presents the concluding remarks.

### 2. Legislated tax changes from 1996 to 2012

The estimation of the impact of tax policy on economic activity presented in this paper relies on a series of shocks especially constructed for the purpose. The starting point in this work is a list of all major

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1 The identification of tax shocks in the narrative approach is thus fundamentally different from the standard method used to identify discretionary tax policy that consists in cyclically adjusting fiscal variables.
legislated tax changes enacted in Portugal since 1996, along with their approval and implementation dates, quantification and assignment to broad categories of revenue such as direct and indirect taxes and social contributions. Detailed information on such dates and the magnitude of tax policy measures is very scarce as it was only recently, in the wake of the euro area sovereign debt crisis, that a systematic reporting and quantification of tax changes became entrenched in budgetary documents. Consequently, the series of shocks is confined to a relatively recent period, from 1996 to 2012, and even for this period its construction required gathering information from several sources. These sources primarily included budget reports, legislation documents and the annual reports of Banco de Portugal. Another important source of information about the revenue effect of tax measures was the data collected under the so-called disaggregated approach for the analysis of fiscal policy within the European System of Central Banks (see Kremer et al. (2006) for a description of the data that serve as an input to this approach). Finally, the treatment of particularly complex issues benefited from discussions with experts.

As far as quantification is concerned, conceptually one wants an estimate of revenue effects holding GDP constant in the sense that these estimates should not consider the feedback effect of GDP on tax revenues. Measures were generally quantified this way in the sources. This is particularly important for measures with a large potential influence on economic activity, such as changes in the value added tax rate, as a consideration of feedback effects would typically lead to an overestimation of the response of economic activity. Tax changes are quantified in nominal terms.

When different estimates for the magnitude of a particular tax change were available in the sources, information about the implementation details in the legislation and other documents was used in deciding what figure to take. The confrontation of several sources helped cross-checking estimates in order to reduce the noise that could be introduced by the political process. At the same time, inconsistencies can arise from the methods for quantification of revenue effects used in different sources (or in the same source over time), but in practice the fact that the sample is restricted to recent years helps mitigate this issue.

The legislated tax changes considered are confined to measures with an expected effect on economic activity. This criterion led in particular to the exclusion of the securitization of tax revenues, implemented by the Portuguese government in 2003. This was a financial operation enacted in order to fulfil the budget deficit target and, although it affected tax revenues as recorded in national accounts, it did not impact the amounts actually paid by economic agents. Consequently, it is unlikely to have directly affected economic activity.

For the purpose of deriving the quarterly shocks in the next sections, it is useful to distinguish between three types of measures according to the nature of their revenue effects. Firstly, there are measures with a permanent effect on receipts and for these the annualised long-term (i.e., on-going) figure is retained. Occasionally some tax changes of this type, such as those regarding the value added tax rates, are quantified in the sources for less than a full year and taking into consideration the seasonality of the relevant macroeconomic base. Such seasonal effects must be undone in the calculation of the annualised figure. Secondly, our sample comprises measures that affect revenue only temporarily, and these are quantified on the basis of the overall variation in receipts resulting from the measure. Finally, a third category consists of measures that switch revenue from one year to the other: for instance, an increase in prepayments of the corporate income tax, or in the amounts withheld at source in the personal income tax, offset by a decrease in balances due or an increase in refunds in the following year. These measures while taking

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2 Many of these changes were part of the State Budget, although there were several exceptions. In Portugal the State Budget for the next year is usually submitted to Parliament in October and, after approval, it comes into force in January.

3 In the subsequent years, however, there is some evidence that the securitization operation may have pressured for a more efficient tax collection.

4 Note that some of these measures may have additional temporary short-term revenue effects which have to be considered when a time of payment perspective is adopted in the compilation of shocks - see section 4.1.
effect permanently have a yearly revenue profile akin to that of measures with a temporary nature, in
that revenue changes initially but goes back to the original level after some time.

Recent decades featured frequent modifications in tax legislation and this made it possible to compile a
comprehensive list of around 70 measures with a potential effect on economic activity over the period
1996-2012. This list is shown in Appendix A and it includes the year of implementation, the tax concerned,
a brief description of the measure and its quantification (as a percentage of nominal GDP). Moreover
measures are classified according to their effects into permanent, temporary and revenue-switching.

3. The role of motivations behind tax changes and endogeneity concerns

The adequate estimation of the effects of tax changes on GDP growth requires a series of tax shocks
that are exogenous, i.e. do not respond to current and future economic developments, in order to
avoid the so-called simultaneity bias. In order to understand this bias, consider the effects on GDP of an
endogenous policy measure, say, deliberately taken to prevent a recession. If this measure was successful,
output would grow «normally» following it and an econometrician would have wrongly concluded that
it had no impact on output.

Previous studies using the narrative method focused on the motivation behind tax measures as a way
to concentrate on exogenous actions. Tax measures deemed endogenous in Romer and Romer (2008)
are taken in response to information about current or prospective economic developments and include
countercyclical policy and spending-driven tax changes. In contrast, measures classified as exogenous
include namely those targeted at fostering long-term growth and reducing inherited fiscal imbalances.
The relevance of these criteria in the Portuguese case is now discussed.

As to countercyclical policy, in the sample period there is only one episode that can be considered as a
discretionary government action aimed at stabilising the economy, comprising a few measures taken
around the international financial crisis that erupted in 2008. The Portuguese action plan (Iniciativa
para o Investimento e o Emprego) within the 2009 European Economic Recovery Plan, along with other
measures already implemented in 2008 and described in the documents as having a countercyclical
motivation (see, for example, Ministério das Finanças, 2009, Chapter II.4), had nevertheless a rather
modest size (annualised effect of around 0.1 percent of GDP). Note that the major fiscal measures
enacted under this action plan were on the expenditure side. Other measures that brought down the
tax burden in the same period, such as the reduction of the standard rate of the value added tax, were
not part of the official documents related to the fiscal stimulus and thus cannot be classified as pursuing
macroeconomic stabilisation.

Such a lack of importance of the countercyclical motive, unlike previous studies using the narrative
approach for the US and the UK, is also related to the sample period. Those studies are based on extended
samples that start shortly after WWII, and thus include the «golden age» of fiscal policy as a tool for
demand management. Also in the US and the UK there were hardly any countercyclical tax measures
after 1980 until recently.

Regarding spending-driven tax policy, there is no evidence in the documents analysed for Portugal of
changes in taxes responding to measures on the expenditure side. In fact, the conduct of fiscal policy in
Portugal and the approach followed in setting-up the budget may not favour such a direct link between
expenditure and revenue measures.

While some measures in Table 1 - for example the reductions of the corporate income tax rate - can be
seen as motivated by the desire to promote long-term growth, the major motivation behind tax changes
in Portugal over the last decade has been the need to comply with the Stability and Growth Pact rules.
Measures intending to curb deficits and enhance fiscal sustainability generally qualify as exogenous
in the Romer and Romer (2008) typology. Nevertheless, the Portuguese and European contexts have
specificities that follow from the emphasis on a target defined by reference to the actual deficit in the Stability and Growth Pact. This may establish a link between downturns in economic activity and the need to implement fiscal tightening.

There is evidence of pro-cyclical discretionary fiscal policy in Portugal (Cunha and Braz, 2009) as the European Monetary Union integration process required keeping the deficit below the reference level in a period of low GDP growth. More generally, Agnello and Cimadomo (2009) find evidence of a pro-cyclical behaviour of legislated revenue changes prior to the recent financial crisis for European Union countries, indicating that this was not a peculiarity of the Portuguese fiscal policy. However, besides macroeconomic developments, many other factors may trigger episodes of budgetary slippage such as hikes in health- or age-related expenditure. In any case, when measuring the effects of tax shocks, a specification controlling for past economic conditions is used and this accounts for the possibility of a response to them.

Finally, some of the tax changes considered were part of fiscal consolidation packages involving simultaneously measures on the expenditure side. This tends to bring about a contemporaneous correlation with spending shocks (Pereira and Wemans, 2013, find this kind of evidence for Portugal) and is taken into account in the robustness exercises.

4. Transforming the measures into a quarterly series of tax shocks

4.1 The benchmark approach: focusing on the time of payment

The construction of a quarterly series of tax shocks requires that the effect on revenue of each measure is assigned to a particular quarter (or quarters). This is far from a mechanical procedure and in many cases a deep knowledge of each measure’s particularities is necessary. For instance, the way a change in personal income tax rates or deduction rules affects the behaviour of economic agents may depend on whether such change modifies the amounts withheld at source or, instead, the tax refunds in the following year. The principle followed in deriving the benchmark shock measure was to date tax changes in accordance with the time taxes have to be paid.

This focus on the implementation date is also adopted by Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2011) for their benchmark analysis. In fact, there is strong microeconomic evidence mainly for the United States that anticipated changes in taxes influence the behaviour of economic agents at time they take effect (e.g. Johnston et al., 2006), suggesting the impact on disposable income as a key channel of transmission of tax shocks to economic activity (see Jappelli and Pistaferri (2010) for a review of the literature on consumption responses to changes in income). In the Portuguese case this approach is further justified by the existence of a significant share of liquidity constrained income. Moreover the importance of the implementation date may reflect other factors, such as a lack of detailed information on tax policy measures that would allow economic agents to accurately predict the change in future tax payments they entail.

The time of payment rule applies as follows. The most straightforward case consists of measures with permanent effects, affecting tax payments made in a continuous way, for example, concerning the value added tax rates or the personal income tax, if fully reflected on the withholding tables. Such actions are recorded once, in the quarter of implementation, by 1/4 of the annualised revenue change. Note that they represent a permanent level shift in revenues from that quarter onwards and our shock measure tries to capture changes in taxation.

5 Castro (2006) estimates a 40 per cent share of liquidity constrained income for Portugal between the mid-nineties and 2005. In addition, this study finds a positive relationship between this share and the unemployment rate, a fact that could support an increase of liquidity constrained income in recent years.
Some legislated tax changes affect revenue in a temporary way. These are recorded by the variation in the amounts raised in each quarter, and are cancelled by a symmetrical shock in the following quarter, reflecting the return of receipts to the original level.

A particularly difficult case concerns permanent measures that affect intermittent tax payments, in the sense that they occur only in specific quarters of the year. This is especially the case of payments of the corporate income tax\(^6\) and the annual refunds of the personal income tax. On the one hand, in order to adhere strictly to the time of payment principle, shocks should be recorded in the quarter of payment and cancelled in the next (given the absence of a payment). However, such a recording would have to go on forever. On the other hand, these tax payments generally concern previous year’s income or wealth, and therefore a certain smoothing behaviour by agents appears plausible. In particular, corporations are typically in a good position to forecast tax their liabilities and, in addition, face less liquidity constraints than households and adopt an extended horizon in their investment decisions. Therefore, for these measures the time of payment approach is applied taking the year (instead of the quarter) as a reference.

We assume that economic agents consider the change in the payments for the year as a whole owing to the measure and incorporate this information in their behaviour from the first quarter\(^7\) (for measures coming into force in January, which is usually the case). Such change is thus spread uniformly over the four quarters, and 1/4 of it is recorded in the first quarter.

Measures switching revenue from one year to the other - see section 2 - are, in the first year, recorded following the rules for permanent measures. This typically leads to assigning to the first quarter 1/4 of the change in revenue for the year as a whole. In the next year (first quarter) there is a symmetrical cancellation recording, given the return of revenues to the original level.

### 4.2 An alternative approach: focusing on approval dates and cumulative liabilities

The idea behind the construction of the benchmark series of shocks is that the relevant moment for measuring the macroeconomic effects of taxation is when agents have to pay their taxes. However if the behaviour of consumers was primarily influenced by their permanent income expectations, the relevant moment would instead be when they learned that their future disposable income would change. In this case, they would modify their behaviour at the time of credible announcement of the measure. Similarly, firms may adopt a multi-year horizon for some of their investment decisions, particularly large scale ones\(^8\), the relevant piece of information being in this case the long-run change in tax liabilities.

This approach brings the timing of the shock closer to the moment of announcement of the underlying measure, and in this sense is also more adequate to capture possible impacts on economic activity through the expectations channel (for instance, a positive impact of measures that enhance the soundness of the fiscal stance). The time of credible announcement of a measure is approximated by the date of approval of the respective legislation\(^9\) (the exact date considered was that of publication in the Diário

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6 The corporate income tax code foresees prepayments equal to between 70 and 90 per cent of the previous year’s tax liability that take place in three instalments in July, September and December. The settlement of the final tax liability occurs in May of the following year.

7 In the case of changes in the corporation income tax rates, further assumptions have to be made (see Pereira and Wemans, 2013b).

8 In contrast, the recording of the tax shock taking as a reference the amount to be paid over the one-year horizon, in the time of payment approach, may provide a better basis for assessing the effects of taxes on small-scale investment decisions (such as acquisition of transportation equipment).

9 It is very difficult to construct a shock measure that goes beyond this. Agents usually learn about a measure before approval, but the moment this happens is hard to establish. At the same time, many measures are dropped or strongly modified in the course of the legislative procedure, and one would need an assessment about the probability agents attach to the approval of each proposal.
In calculating the cumulative change in liabilities, short-term revenue effects related to pre-payments or refunds do not matter.

In the case of permanent measures affecting continuous tax payments, the time of payment and cumulative liabilities approaches differ only to the extent that there is a lag between approval and implementation. Note that, in this case, there are no short-run revenue effects that originate a difference vis-a-vis the long-run figure. In the cumulative liabilities approach measures that affect taxes paid intermittently are recorded once, by 1/4 of the annualised long-run revenue change. For measures temporarily affecting receipts, the shock is assigned to the quarter when the respective legislative change was approved, by the overall change in revenue, and cancelled in the following one. Finally, measures switching revenue from one year to the other are disregarded, as it is assumed that economic agents realise that these have no effect on their net tax liabilities.

### 4.3 An overview of the series of tax shocks

The series obtained in the time of payment approach are illustrated in Chart 1 for shocks to direct taxes (including social security contributions), and in Chart 2 for shocks to indirect taxes. The shaded areas signal the periods when GDP contracted for at least two consecutive quarters.

In the case of direct taxes, there is a first major negative shock in the initial quarter of 2001, resulting from the combination of a reduction in the corporate income tax rate and the reform of the personal income tax coming into force in 2001 (the shock measure also reflects the cancellation of the temporary effect of the increase in the corporate income tax prepayments in 2000). The special scheme for the payment of tax arrears («perdão fiscal»), in the last quarter of 2002, gave rise to a particularly noticeable shock affecting both direct and indirect taxes, matched by a negative one in the following quarter. This programme allowed tax arrears with a legal collection date until 31 December 2002 to be settled without paying interest or fines. After that, there is a significant negative shock in 2005 that reflects the lagged

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**Source:** Authors’ calculations.

**Note:** Shaded areas are the periods when GDP contracted for two or more consecutive quarters.

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10 This shock has a specific nature in that it does not concern taxes to be paid but instead taxes that ought to have been paid. Still it captures a unique episode of a very large change in the amount of tax payments mostly concentrated in one quarter. Therefore it was considered in the estimation - but in a robustness section we show how results change when this episode is excluded.
effects of the corporate income tax rate reduction of 2004. In the later sample years, several measures led to a series of positive shocks to direct taxes, the largest one being the 2011 personal income tax surcharge, impacting chiefly the last quarter of that year and, given its temporary nature, originating a cancelation in the subsequent quarter.

Regarding indirect taxes, besides the special scheme for the payment of tax arrears, already mentioned, several increases in the value added tax rates translated into significant positive shocks. The change in the average rate of the tax on oil products in 2000 was the most significant tax reduction in the sample period. More recently, in 2012, there is another large positive shock, brought about by the application of the standard value added tax rate to goods previously subject to the reduced or intermediate rates.

To conclude, the special scheme for the payment of taxes in 2002 clearly stands out as the most significant shock in the sample. Moreover, the measures taken in the period before and in the course of the Economic and Financial Assistance Programme also give rise to a prominent sequence of shocks. Note further that there is a positive contemporaneous correlation between direct and indirect tax shocks (the correlation coefficient is about 0.45). This mirrors the fact that many tax policy measures were aimed at fiscal tightening, and were not, in particular, shifts between different types of taxation. This is in contrast with the evidence in Princen et al. (2013), who analyse discretionary tax measures between 2001 and 2012 in several EU countries and find evidence of increases in indirect taxes, matched by cuts in direct taxes, targeting a shift to growth-friendlier tax bases.

5. Effects of tax policy on output

5.1 Benchmark results

The macroeconomic impacts of the tax shocks derived in the previous section can be assessed on the basis of reduced-form specifications, under the assumption that the shocks do not respond to contemporaneous or prospective changes in economic activity. As explained in section 3, within our set of legislated tax changes only very few have a countercyclical motivation: these are identified and can be easily excluded from the estimation. We come back to this issue below.

The specification used (see Pereira and Wemans, 2013b) regresses output growth ($\Delta \ln y_t$) on the contemporaneous value and on 4 lags of the shock measure ($\Delta T_{t-\Delta}$) and 4 own lags:

$$\Delta \ln y_t = \alpha + \sum_{i=1}^{4} \beta_i \Delta T_{t-i} + \sum_{i=1}^{4} \gamma_i \Delta \ln y_{t-i} + \epsilon_t. \quad (1)$$

The regression is in first differences because the shock measure captures changes in taxation. The shock series starts in 1996:Q1. Given that 4 lags of the variables are included, the estimation, by ordinary least squares, uses a sample between 1997:Q1 and 2012:Q4. GDP and all the other macroeconomic variables considered are seasonally adjusted prior to estimation. The effect of the shocks is determined as a cumulative dynamic multiplier. As it is plausible that some components of GDP, notably private investment, react to tax shocks with a lag greater than one year, we also report the results considering 8 lags of the shock measure.

Chart 3 presents the effects on output of an increase in taxes of 1 percentage point of GDP and one-standard-deviation confidence bands\textsuperscript{11} for the benchmark tax shock measure. The response of GDP is negative and builds up steadily, attaining -1.3 percent after one year, and -2.7 percent after three

\textsuperscript{11} The bands for this and the other dynamic multipliers throughout the paper were obtained by a standard Monte-Carlo procedure, drawing 1000 vectors of coefficients from a multivariate normal with mean and variance-covariance given by the least squares point estimates. An output response for each draw was computed; the standard deviation across all responses is presented.
years. In the subsequent period it strengthens a bit further, to around -3.0 percent, and remains thereafter at this level, being thus highly persistent. This effect on output is statistically significant, although the confidence bands are wide. These findings indicate that legislated tax increases (decreases) have a powerful recessive (expansionary) impact on economic activity. The high persistence of the output response suggests a possible role of incentives and other factors on the supply side in the transmission of tax policy to economic activity. However, the uncertainty surrounding the estimates for longer horizons does not allow clear conclusions in this respect.

Excluding from the shock series the few tax changes that have a countercyclical motivation, the output response remains virtually the same. Therefore in the remainder of the paper the full set of legislated changes is considered. Furthermore, if the lag length of the shock measure is increased to 8 in equation (1), the trajectory of output deviates only slightly from that presented in Chart 3, decreasing by 1.2 percent one year out and 2.9 percent three years out.

Comparing with previous studies using the narrative approach, Romer and Romer (2010) and Cloyne (2011) report negative impacts on output which take between two to three years to build up and reach maxima, respectively, around -3.0 and -2.5 percent of GDP. Moreover, the first of these studies also finds a rather persistent output response. Such magnitudes for the impact of taxes are much in line with the ones for Portugal.¹²

Breaking down taxes into direct and indirect, the point estimates (not shown) indicate a fall in output by 0.7 percent after one year and 2.2 percent after three years, following a 1 percent of GDP change in direct taxes and by, respectively, 2.3 and 3.0 percent, following an identical change in indirect taxes. Therefore, as far as point estimates are concerned, there is a sizeable negative impact on economic activity for both categories of taxes. However, the confidence bands widen noticeably in comparison to Chart 3 and, albeit still clearly indicating a negative sign, encompass a zero response (see Pereira and Wemans, 2013b).

Chart 3

OUTPUT RESPONSE TO DISCRETIONARY TAX POLICY

Source: Authors’ calculations.
Note: The shocks amount to 1 percent of GDP.

¹² Cloyne notes that the similarity of the results for the UK and for the US is surprising, given the very different tax systems in the two countries, as well as sources used and procedures followed to obtain the shock series. It is interesting to note that we have reached the same type of findings for Portugal.

¹³ In estimating the effects of direct and indirect taxes separately, it is necessary to take into account that shocks to the two types of taxes are contemporaneously correlated (see section 4.3) and thus each series has to be included in the equation used to measure the other’s effect on output.
5.2. Robustness: outliers and controlling for expenditure

As seen in section 4.3 a number of tax policy actions stand out for their size, notably the special scheme for the payment of tax arrears in 2002 («perdão fiscal») and several measures taken during the recent period of fiscal consolidation, from 2010 to 2012. Such large tax changes are legitimate observations to consider. Nevertheless one may ask whether they are driving the large negative effects of taxation on GDP documented above, given that our sample is small and the mentioned tax increases (albeit partly temporary) coincided with periods of contraction in economic activity (see Charts 1 and 2).

In order to address this issue, we (i) dropped the amounts related to the special scheme for the payment of tax arrears from the shock series, and (ii) considered a sample ending in 2010:Q2. Note that this last exercise implies the loss of about 1/5 of the degrees of freedom available. The GDP responses are shown, respectively, in Charts 4 and 5 (the benchmark response from Chart 3 is also shown, for comparison). As far as the point estimates are concerned, the impact on GDP remains virtually unchanged when the special scheme for the payment of tax arrears is dropped, and weakens but only to a small extent when the last two and a half years are excluded from the sample. The most visible change consists in the widening of the confidence bands, particularly in the second case, which is not surprising given the reduction in the number of degrees of freedom. Overall these robustness exercises indicate that the benchmark results are not being driven by particular episodes of legislated increases in taxes, although they also underline the great uncertainty surrounding a precise quantification of the impact they have on output.

As referred to in section 3, some of the changes in taxation were part of consolidation packages including measures on the expenditure side. Assuming a conventional effect of public spending shocks on GDP, a negative correlation of the latter shocks with tax shocks would tend to overstate the measured depressive impact of taxation. A possible way to assess whether this is causing a substantial bias is to include government expenditure and its lags in equation (1).

The response of output to changes in taxes controlling for spending14 (not shown) is indeed less negative than the benchmark response, but without making much of a difference (they almost coincide for the first four quarters and three years out the fall in GDP is now 2.3 instead of 2.7 percent). It is worth

14 Government spending is defined as the sum of government consumption and investment plus social transfers. Moreover, like GDP, it enters the equation in growth rates.
noting that the inclusion of expenditure in equation (1) allows controlling for shocks to this variable but has the unwanted consequence of holding fixed the trajectory of the variable following tax shocks (expenditure may react to them both directly or indirectly, following the GDP response). This may exaggerate the reduction in the recessive effect of tax shocks when expenditure is taken on board, given the pro-cyclical behaviour of important expenditure categories - see Pereira and Wemans (2013a) - which is likely to override the countercyclical response of some others, like unemployment benefits. In any case, our findings clearly indicate that the inclusion of expenditure is relatively unimportant for the measured effects of discretionary exogenous taxation on GDP.

5.3. A comparison with SVAR results

The narrative approach has most commonly led to larger tax multipliers than the SVAR approach. For example, the multiplier estimated for the US post-war economy by Romer and Romer (2010) reaches -3, while SVARs multipliers for the US usually do not come much beyond -1. The findings of Cloyne (2010) indicate a GDP response similar to the one in Romer and Romer, associating the narrative approach with high negative tax multipliers. Such a tendency is confirmed by the results obtained for Portugal. In fact, the effects of tax shocks presented above are much stronger than the ones estimated in Pereira and Wemans (2013a) using an SVAR.

A direct comparison of the SVAR results with the benchmark results derived from equation (1) would ignore the fact that the two experiments mimic different situations. In fact, in the benchmark analysis above the experiment is a permanent change in taxes. In contrast, in SVARs shocks may decay, i.e. these models yield the output response following a typical tax shock. In order to have more comparable experiments, an alternative to equation (1) is considered, in the form of a bivariate VAR including our shock measure and output growth (see Pereira and Wemans, 2013b). Chart 6 shows the results obtained for this last specification and the SVAR results.

Although both methodologies yield negative effects on GDP, the difference between the results is statistically significant, with the GDP response in the SVAR reaching a maximum of -0.3 percent against -2.4 percent in this study. When taxes are broken down, the point estimates of the GDP responses diverge both for direct and indirect tax shocks. However, more so in the second case as the response hovers around zero in the SVAR while the point estimates are always strongly negative in the narrative approach (though also lacking statistical significance).

Some possible reasons for the different findings in the two methodologies for expenditure shocks have been put forward in the literature. Ramey (2011), focusing on the impact of military spending on GDP and private consumption, has blamed the failure of SVARs to capture the anticipation of fiscal policy measures by economic agents for the differences vis-à-vis the narrative approach. Recall that SVARs generally date tax shocks when revenue is affected, while in the narrative approach, for the reasons given in section 4.1, the benchmark analyses have been based on a time of payment rule. The latter rule corresponds approximately (though not exactly - this point is further discussed below) to the moment revenue changes, taken in the SVARs. Therefore the gap between the GDP responses to tax shocks presented in the empirical work under each methodology cannot be ascribed to anticipation effects.

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15 This is the general trend although in each of the two methodologies the measured impact on economic activity depends on the precise specification used. In addition there is important subsample sensitivity, which further complicates the comparison.

16 Given that in Pereira and Wemans (2013a) the sample ends in the last quarter of 2011, we have replicated the SVAR methodology extending the sample to the last quarter of 2012, in order to eliminate the gap to the sample period in the narrative method. This makes, however, little difference.
Naturally tax shocks in the two methodologies differ in many other ways. In particular, in SVARs they are extracted from the series of total tax revenues, assuming a given elasticity to GDP in order to isolate automatic contemporaneous movements in taxation. The elasticity calibrated into the SVAR model - being only an approximation - is a first reason for the divergence in the findings. Indeed some studies have stressed the sensitivity of SVAR results to changes in calibrated elasticities. For Portugal, however, Pereira and Wemans (2013a) show that their main findings are quite robust to the elasticities assumed, which does not support this particular hypothesis.

The content of shocks is also intrinsically different, as SVAR shocks capture all deviations from systematic policy, while the narrative approach concentrates on discretionary legislated policy (not responding to economic activity), i.e. usually significant and clearly acknowledged actions. Thus SVAR shocks include many changes in revenue that may not be perceived as changes in taxation by economic agents, or at least be perceived as relatively less important ones, such as improvements in the efficiency of tax collection. Moreover, the dating of the shocks in the SVAR approach will depend on accounting rules that can deviate from the date taxes have to be paid, relevant for the narrative approach. This can happen especially in the case of the value added tax as there is a significant lag (albeit partly corrected in national accounts) between the time consumers pay the tax and when companies pass on the amounts collected to the tax authorities. Furthermore, fluctuations in refunds of this tax bring about an important variation in revenues that is irrelevant for consumers. This could help justify the particularly big discrepancy in the findings for the indirect tax multiplier.

The quantitative importance of changes in tax revenues not explained by the business cycle nor legislative actions can be large. Kremer et al. (2006) estimate that for Portugal in the period 1998-2004 such changes, in absolute average and annual terms, stood at 0.4 percent of GDP, above the figure for the legislated changes (0.3 percent). This phenomenon is likely to be even more pronounced when quarterly data are used as they are more affected by short-run volatility in revenues. Consequently the differences in the content of shocks might be the most important single explanatory factor for the larger tax multipliers found in the narrative approach vis-a-vis SVARs.
6. Output response in the cumulative liabilities approach

The benchmark results are based on a shock measure derived assuming that the time of payment is the correct timing for the transmission of discretionary fiscal policy to economic activity. This emphasis on the implementation date is justified by the evidence that consumers respond to changes in current disposable income. Nevertheless, alternative assumptions cannot be ruled out, in particular, that economic agents modify their behaviour at the time a given measure is passed and consider at once the cumulative change in liabilities for the future. The approach put forward in section 4.2 brings the shock measure closer to these assumptions.

As it turns out the output response for the cumulative liabilities series comes rather close to the one for the time of payment series, both in terms of level and profile (Chart 7). The same holds as regards the statistical significance (not shown). This is likely to stem from an important correlation between the shocks in the two approaches. In particular, these coincide for most permanent measures affecting revenues collected continuously over the year. Furthermore, in Portugal the approval of tax changes often does not take place much before implementation, and there are almost no examples of important multi-year tax plans, factors that could amplify the differences between the shocks in the two approaches.12 Lastly, owing to the inclusion of a number of lags of the shock measure in equation (1), this specification may in some cases still capture the effect of shocks on economic activity reasonably well, as a lagged impact, even if the right timing is missed.

Given the limited variability in terms of characteristics of tax measures in our dataset, a more interesting experiment is to consider the GDP response in a regression where one includes both shock series at the same time. This regression captures only the effects on economic activity of those parts of the shocks which do not overlap (as the other shock measure is held constant in the regression). The confidence bands around the GDP responses (not shown) become rather wide, in such a way that they comprise a zero response in both cases. This is likely to reflect the fact that the focus is now on the effects of a portion of the full shocks. Taking into account such lack of statistical significance, the conclusions that follow must be essentially read as hints.

17 Multi-year tax measures are recorded sequentially under the time of payment approach, but only once at the date of approval, for the global amount, under the cumulative liabilities approach.
The trajectory of output following shocks dated in accordance to the time of payment, controlling for the cumulative liabilities series, comes close to that observed for the shock measure as a whole (Chart 8). This provides support to the assumption that output responds to tax changes at the time of implementation. The response of output for the cumulative liabilities measure, holding constant the time of payment series, is initially nil and after about one year it becomes positive albeit small. As said the cumulative liabilities approach is comparatively more suitable for measuring the effects on the economy operating through expectations. Such evidence goes thus against the permanent income theory, but it would be compatible, among other hypotheses, with a positive impact on the confidence of economic agents of tax increases reflecting a prospective improvement in the fiscal stance. Romer and Romer (2010) also document a positive - statistically non-significant - relationship with economic activity for their present-value measure (which bears similarity to our cumulative liabilities measure) when controlling for their benchmark series. Consistently, Mertens and Ravn (2011) find that the tax changes in the Romer and Romer dataset that could be anticipated (in the sense that were announced at least one quarter prior to implementation) have before implementation a positive relationship with output (reversed after implementation).18

7. Response of output components

This section studies the trajectory of some GDP components, namely private consumption and private investment, following legislated tax changes, for the benchmark shock measure. The specification used in doing so is similar to (1), but replacing GDP by the relevant demand component. Following a rise of 1 percent of GDP in taxes, private consumption falls by about 2.0 percent after one year, and 3.5 percent after three years (Chart 9). This is slightly more than the fall in GDP, but overall the responses of the two variables are very much in line with each other. The responses of consumption of non-durables and durables (Chart 10) differ, as expected, by showing a much more pronounced fall for the latter, which stands at 8.3 and 10.6 percent, respectively, one and three years out. In contrast, the corresponding

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18 Note however that the experiment in Mertens and Ravn is not fully comparable with what is done in our study and Romer and Romer. In fact Mertens and Ravn take the Romers’ benchmark series and split it into two subsets: anticipated and non-anticipated shocks. But note that the Romers’ benchmark measure differs from their present-value measure not only as regards timing but also the amounts recorded (similarly to the two alternative shock measures in our study).
reductions in the consumption of non-durables are 1.2 and 2.8 percent. The confidence bands (not shown) indicate that both responses are statistically significant.

Tax policy may have distinct impacts on corporate investment depending on the transmission channel. While the traditional interest rate channel implies a rise in investment following a tax increase, negative effects are also possible, e.g. indirectly through the recessionary impact on output or, in the case of the corporation income tax, the reduction in prospective profitability. Unfortunately the response of private investment to the measure of tax shocks developed in this paper does not shed light on this issue for Portugal. In fact, except for the quarter of impact, in which the response (not shown) is positive, from the second quarter on the confidence bands are approximately symmetrical around a zero response. We increased the number of lags of the shock series up to 8, and used the shock measure based on cumulative liabilities, which could be more adequate in this context, but without coming to very different conclusions. When broken down between investment of households and corporations the responses remain statistically non-significant. For the latter variable, there is a sign change from positive to negative after about two years but, given the degree of uncertainty, it is difficult to assess whether this is meaningful in any way.

While for Portugal the depressing effect of tax shocks appears essentially linked to private consumption, the abovementioned studies for the US and the UK also report a strong recessionary impact on private investment.

8. Concluding remarks

This study develops a quarterly series of discretionary tax policy shocks for Portugal, based on the legislation and contemporary budgetary analyses. It covers the period from 1996 to 2012. Moreover the sample period is characterized by a high density of measures that have been mostly exogenous, in the sense that they were independent from current and prospective macroeconomic conditions. The benchmark analysis is based on the assumption that economic agents respond to changes in taxes when their current income is affected.

The estimated multiplier effects of tax shocks on economic activity are negative and high, in line with the results of other studies belonging to the same strand of the literature. Legislated tax changes of 1 percent of GDP reduce output by 1.3 percent one year out. These estimates are statistically significant, although surrounded by a reasonable degree of uncertainty, and are robust to a number of variations in the specification used to measure the impacts and to the exclusion of abnormally large measures. The evidence thus suggests that legislated increases (decreases) in taxes have considerable recessionary (expansionary) effects. A shock of the same magnitude has an effect on consumption of around -2.0 percent after one year. Consumption of durables responds particularly strongly to changes in taxation.

This paper also considers an alternative shock measure better suited for capturing a possible role of expectations in the transmission of fiscal policy. Note that the conduct and implementation of tax policy in Portugal does not provide a good setting for studying the issue, as most measures affect income close to the date of approval. With this caveat, there is a hint of a positive relationship between the expectations component of tax changes and economic activity. This could theoretically stem from beneficial effects on economic growth coming from the prospect of fiscal consolidation.

The estimated impact of changes in taxation on economic activity for Portugal is much stronger in this paper than in previous work using the SVAR methodology, as it has been the case for other countries. This gap can be ascribed to many differences in the two methodologies, where the content of the shock figures prominently. While in the narrative approach shocks come strictly from discretionary exogenous government policy, in SVAR they reflect many other factors to which economic agents may respond differently. In fact the two methodologies embody exercises that are not exactly equivalent.
Note finally that the narrative shock measures, as the one developed in this study, fit in with the alternative indicators of fiscal effort recently put forward by the European Commission (2013, Part III).

References


Banco de Portugal, Annual Report, Several years. Lisboa: Banco de Portugal


Ministério das Finanças, Orçamento do Estado - Relatório, Several years. Lisboa: Ministério das Finanças


### Appendix A (continues)

**LIST OF TAX POLICY MEASURES IN PORTUGAL, 1996 TO 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
<th>Quantification (% GDP)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Introduction of an intermediate rate (12%) in July (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Tax rate reduction from 36 to 34% (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Increase in the prepayment rate from 75 to 85% for high-profit firms (r.s.e.)</td>
<td>0 (+/-0.26)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Introduction of lower rates for companies located on inland regions and for small companies plus a reduction in the tax rate from 34 to 32% (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Reductions on the tax rates and inclusion of an additional bracket (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.24</td>
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<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Especially strong update of bracket limits on withholding tables (r.s.e.)</td>
<td>0 (+/-0.25)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Special scheme for the payment of tax arrears (t.e.)</td>
<td>0.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Special scheme for the payment of tax arrears (t.e.)</td>
<td>0.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Tax rate reduction from 32 to 30% (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Standard tax rate increase from 17 to 19% in June (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Special scheme for the payment of tax arrears (t.e.)</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Social contributions</td>
<td>Special scheme for the payment of tax arrears (t.e.)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>Other indirect</td>
<td>Special scheme for the payment of tax arrears (t.e.)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Increase in the special advanced payment rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Tax rate reduction from 30 to 25% (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.45</td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.18</td>
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<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Decline in tax rates compensated by a reduction of tax credits (r.s.e.)</td>
<td>0 (+/-0.12)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Standard tax rate increase from 19 to 21% in July (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Change in the average tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>Social contributions</td>
<td>Increase of self employed social contributions in July (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Reintroduction of tax credits (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Introduction of a new top bracket (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Gradual increase in the taxation of income from pensions (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Rise in the tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Multi-year increase of the unitary tax component (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Elimination of the different treatment of married and single taxpayers (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Changes in the taxation of dividends (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Rise in the tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Social contributions</td>
<td>Reform of the taxation of vehicles in July (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>Other indirect</td>
<td>Increase of the public employees and pensioners contribution to their health system (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### LIST OF TAX POLICY MEASURES IN PORTUGAL, 1996 TO 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tax</th>
<th>Brief Description</th>
<th>Quantification (%) GDP</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Increase in tax credits (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Introduction of tax benefits (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Change in the calculation of taxable income (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>IMI</td>
<td>Reduction in top tax rates by mid-year (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.04</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Decline in the standard tax rate from 21 to 20% in July (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Raise in tax benefits to people with disabilities (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Rate cut from 25 to 12.5% applied to low values of taxable income (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Changes in the rules for prepayments (r.s.e.)</td>
<td>0 (+/-0.03)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Reduction in the special prepayment limit (p.e.)</td>
<td>-0.03</td>
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<td>2009</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>Increase in the tax rate (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Special surcharge on the income from pensions and labour of 1% for the 3rd and 4th income brackets and 1.5% for the higher brackets in July (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Increase of withholding rates on capital income in July (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Introduction of a new bracket with a marginal rate of 45% to be applied to taxable income exceeding 150.000 euros (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Increase of 2.5 p.p. in the rate applied to high taxable profits</td>
<td>0.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>Other direct</td>
<td>Special taxation scheme for undeclared income from capital held abroad (t.e.)</td>
<td>0.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Increase in all rates by 1 p.p. in July (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.61</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>New ceilings for tax benefits; higher taxation of capital gains and reduction of the deduction applicable to pensions’ income above 22.500 euros (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Extraordinary surcharge of 3.5% on 2011’s taxable income (t.e.)</td>
<td>0.58</td>
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<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Introduction of a ceiling to tax benefits (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Other direct</td>
<td>Effect of the introduction of a new tax on the banking sector (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Increase in the standard rate from 21 to 23% (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Increase of the rate applied to electricity and natural gas in October (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>ISP</td>
<td>Reduction of tax benefits (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>Social contributions</td>
<td>Entry into force of the new contributory code; increase in the contributory rate for public employees from 10 to 11% (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Reduction of tax benefits (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Increase in the taxation of pensions (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Solidarity surcharge on highest pensions (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>IRS</td>
<td>Increase of the taxation on capital income (p.e.)</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>Surcharge inflated in 2010 extended to profits exceeding 1.5 million euros plus introduction of a surcharge on profits exceeding 10 million euros (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>IMI</td>
<td>Increase of top and bottom tax rates and elimination of exemptions (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>Other direct</td>
<td>Special taxation scheme for undeclared income from capital held abroad (t.e.)</td>
<td>0.16</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>IVA</td>
<td>Changes in the lists of goods and services subject to reduced rates (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.99</td>
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<td>2012</td>
<td>IT</td>
<td>IABA</td>
<td>Increase in excise taxes (p.e.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>ISV</td>
<td>Update of the tax (p.e.)</td>
<td>0.01</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Sources:** Banco de Portugal and Ministério das Finanças.

**Notes:** IVA-Value Added Tax; ISP-Tax on Oil Products; IRC-Corporate Income Tax; IRS-Personal Income Tax; IT-Tax on Tobacco; IABA-Tax on Alcohol and Alcoholic Beverages; ISV-Tax on Vehicle Sales; IMI-Municipal Tax on Real Estate; p.e.-permanent effects; t.e.-temporary effects; r.s.e.-revenue switching effects.